When agents collaborate to perform a control task, it is of interest to characterize the set of joint probability distributions they can achieve on their joint action space when they are passively provided with external common randomness. We give a simple counterexample to a natural conjecture about this class of joint distributions.
Introduction
Consider a multiagent control problem where each agent takes actions based on its own observations. Often an external source, e.g. a satellite with a view of the entire field of operations, can passively provide common randomness to the agents, which enables them to increase the set of achievable joint distributions on their joint action space. It is of interest to characterize this set of achievable joint distributions on the joint action space of the agents. Our main contribution is to give a simple counterexample to a natural conjecture about this class of joint distributions.
Motivation
Let us motivate the importance of the class of joint distributions we are studying, through a simple game theoretic example. For basic concepts from game theory see [6] or [12] . Further motivation for the study of common randomness comes from game theory, information theory, and cryptography, where its role has been extensively explored [1] [2] [3] [4] [7] [8] [9] [10] 13, 14, [18] [19] [20] . * Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: ananth@eecs.berkeley.edu (V. Anantharam), borkar@tifr.res.in (V. Borkar). 1 Research supported by NSF Grant CCF-0500234 and ONR Grant N00014-1-0637. 2 Research supported by CEFIPRA Grant 2900-IT-1. Consider a zero sum game between two players. Let U denote the set of pure strategies of player I and V the set of pure strategies of player I I . Assume that both these sets are finite. Let r: U×V → R denote the payoff to player I from player I I when the pure strategies played are u ∈ U and v ∈ V, respectively. Player I wishes to maximize and player I I to minimize the expected payoff. Each player acts in his or her own interest, i.e. the game is non-cooperative. The traditional solution concept for a non-cooperative game is Nash equilibrium, i.e. a strategy pair where each player's strategy is a best response to that of the other player.
Nash equilibrium for zero sum games need not exist in pure strategies. A simple example is the zero sum game with pure strategy sets U = {U, D} and V = {L, R}, and with the payoff function
However every zero sum game admits a Nash equilibrium in privately randomized strategies [16, 17] . 3 Let P(U) and P(V) denote the respective sets of privately randomized strategies. 3 Note that the concept of Nash equilibrium only appeared after these papers were published [11] .
A Nash equilibrium ( * , * ) is characterized by the saddle point condition
and in [16, 17] it is shown that such a saddle point exists.
We now formulate a distributed zero-sum game. We think of the minimizing player as being represented by a number of distributed agents. For instance, actuators associated to the sensors in a sensor network may act as such a player in a game against an adversary [15] . For simplicity, focus on the situation where there are two agents that together form the minimizing player, call them I I A and I I B , respectively. Thus we now have a game between three agents: I , I I A , and I I B , with the latter two working together as a single player against the first. Let U, V A , and V B denote the set of pure strategies of agents I , I I A , and I I B , respectively; assume these are finite sets. Let r: U × V A × V B → R denote the payoff to player I from player I I when the pure strategies used are u ∈ U, v A ∈ V A , and v B ∈ V B , respectively. Player I wishes to maximize and player I I to minimize the expected payoff. A pair of pure strategies u ∈ U and (v A , v B ) ∈ V A × V B would be called a Nash equilibrium if the strategy of each player is a best response to the strategy of the other player. More generally, this terminology can be applied to a pair of randomized strategies.
The importance of the set of joint probability distributions achievable by the collaborating distributed agents representing player I I may be seen through an example. Let U = V A = V B = {0, 1}, and let r(u, v A , v B ) be given by
If the agents I I A and I I B are only allowed private randomization, there is no Nash equilibrium in this game even in randomized strategies. To see this, consider the randomized strategy of player I , choosing u = 1 with probability , 0 1. The following matrix gives the view the distributed player I I has of the payoff:
When the agents representing player I I have no common randomness, their best response is given by Range Best response of I I Best response of I to this
Examining this shows that there is no Nash equilibrium in this game. More generally, if not enough common randomness is provided to the agents I I A and I I B , there is again no Nash equilibrium in randomized strategies. To see this observe that, as in the preceding analysis, for the randomized strategy of player I of playing u = 1 with probability , 0 1, if < 1 2 or > 1 2 the best response of the distributed player I I is determined as in the preceding table and the best response of player I to this is also determined as in that table. For = 1 2 , apart from the two possible best responses of the distributed player I I listed in the preceding table, the provision of common randomness to the agents comprising this player offers the possibility of randomizing between these responses. However, if there is less than one bit of common randomness available between the two agents comprising player I I , the best response of this distributed player and the best response of player I to this could only become
Range
Best response of I I Best response of I to this
Uneven mixture of (0, 1) u= 0 or u = 1 resp. and (1, 0) Again one sees that there is no Nash equilibrium. If the outcome of an externally generated fair coin toss is provided to the agents representing player I I , they get one bit of common randomness, these agents can coordinate to randomize equiprobably between the actions (v A , v B )=(0, 1) and (v A , v B )= (1, 0) . This strategy of player I I is in Nash equilibrium with the strategy of player I that randomizes equiprobably between the actions u = 0 and 1.
In the game theoretic example of this section, the agents take actions without any observations. In control scenarios, collaborating agents would have individual observations and seek to create a joint distribution on their joint action space based on these observations and passively provided external common randomness. In the next section we discuss the control scenario.
Common randomness and distributed control
Consider a distributed controller comprised, for simplicity, of exactly two agents. The agents observe jointly distributed random variables A and B, respectively. The agents are also provided with external common randomness, represented by a random variable W . The external randomness is assumed to be passively provided, hence independent of the observations. The agents wish to take actions X and Y , respectively. Each agent can choose its action using an arbitrary privately randomized function of its observation and of the externally provided common randomness. All the random variables are assumed to take values in finite sets. Let (a, b) denote the joint distribution of the observations (A, B) . , w)p(y|b, w) (a, b) .
Thus we can achieve joint distributions on (X, Y, A, B, W ) of the form p(w)p(x|a
(
This class is characterized by the conditions
that is to say (A, B) has joint distribution (a, b), W is independent of (A, B), X and Y are conditionally independent given (A, B, W ), X and B are conditionally independent given (A, W ), and Y and A are conditionally independent given (B, W ).
For basic notions in information theory see e.g. [5] . To see that the form (1) implies the conditions (2) is straightforward. For the converse, first note that the first three parts of conditions (2) 
it would be possible to find some W (on a possibly augmented sample space) such that (X, Y, A, B, W ) satisfy conditions (2) . It turns out that this conjecture is false, as we will now show. Apart from the general discussion of the importance of externally provided common randomness in control and the formulation of distributed zero sum games, we view this counterexample as the main contribution of this paper. It highlights an inherent limitation on what is achievable by passively provided external common randomness. Let X = Y = {1, 2, 3} and A = B = {0, 1}. Let (a, b) be the uniform distribution assigning probability 1 4 to each (a, b) . The joint distribution of (X, Y ) conditioned on (a, b) is described as below: 1, 1, 1, w) (a) If, proceeding as in the preceding equation, we had instead dropped the X = 1 condition at the first step and then replaced A = 1 by A = 0 we would have got (3, 1, 0, 1, w) .
We now list the equalities of this form that we can show. Keeping A = 1 and flipping B while leaving X unchanged gives the equations: We conclude that, for the chosen w, p(x, y, a, b, w) is the same for all (x, y, a, b) in the support of p(x, y, a, b) . Since this is true for every w, we conclude that W is independent of (X, Y, A, B) . From this we can conclude that X and Y are independent, by writing 
Concluding remarks
We discussed the importance of externally provided common randomness in distributed control. We formulated a class of so-called distributed zero sum games; this formulation is naturally motivated by problems in the emerging field of sensor networks. We discussed the characterization of the class of joint probability distributions that can be achieved on their joint action space by a set of distributed agents with individual observations, when they are passively provided with external common randomness. We gave a counterexample to a natural conjecture about this class of distributions. This counterexample brings out an inherent limitation on what is achievable by passively provided external common randomness.
